I no longer update this bibliography (last updated 7/25/2006). However, since 2009 I have been the area editor for Philosophy of Neuroscience at PhilPapers.org: http://philpapers.org/browse/philosophy-of-neuroscience/
In September 2011, Alexander Ovsov translated this into Romanian. It's available here: http://webhostinggeeks.com/science/pete-mandiks-rm



Akins, K. 1993. A bat without qualities? Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. M. Davies and G. Humphreys, Basil Blackwell.

Akins, K. 1993. What is it like to be boring and myopic? Dennett and his Critics. B. Dahlbom, Basil Blackwell.

Akins, K. 1996. Lost the Plot? Reconstructing Dennett's Multiple Drafts Theory of Consciousness. Mind and Language 11(1): 1-46.

Akins, K. 1996. Of Sensory Systems and the "Aboutness" of Mental States. Journal of Philosophy: 337-72.

Akins, K. and S. Winger 1996. Ships in the Night: Churchland and Ramachandran on Dennett's Theory of Consciousness. Perception. (ed.) K. Akins.

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Bechtel, W. 1983 . A bridge between cognitive science and neuroscience: The functional architecture of mind. Philosophical Studies 44:319-30.

Bechtel, W. 1984. Autonomous psychology: What it should and should not entail. Philosophy of Science Association 1984, 1:43-55 .

Bechtel, W. 1986. What happens to accounts of mind-brain relations if we forgo an architecture of rules and representations? Philosophy of Science Association 1986, 159-71.

Bechtel, W. 1987. Connectionism and the philosophy of mind. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 26:17-41. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition. Basil Blackwell, 1990 .

Bechtel, W. 1988. Connectionism and rules and representation systems: Are they compatible? Philosophical Psychology 1:5-16.

Bechtel, W. 1993. Currents in connectionism. Minds and Machines, 3, 125-153.

Bechtel, W. 1993. The case for connectionism. Philosophical Studies, 71, 119-154.

Bechtel, W. 1994. Natural deduction in connectionist systems. Synthese 101, 433-463. (This is available as a postscript file.)

Bechtel, W. 1995. Biological and social constraints on cognitive processes: The need for dynamical interactions between levels of organization. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 20, pp. 133-164.

Bechtel, W. 1995. Consciousness: Perspectives from Symbolic and Connectionist AI. Neuropsychologia, 33, 1075-1086 (This is available as a postscript file.)

Bechtel, W. 1996. Responsibility and decision making in the era of neural networks. Social Philosophy and Policy.

Bechtel, W. 1996. What should a connectionist philosophy of science look like? In R. N. McCauley, ed., The Churchlands and their critics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (This is available as a postscript file.)

Bechtel, W. 1997. Embodied Connectionism. In D. Johnson and C. E. Erneling, The future of  the cognitive revolution, pp. 187-208. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (This is available as a postscript file.)

Bechtel, W. & Abrahamsen, A. 1990. Beyond the exclusively propositional era. Synthese 82:223-53.

Bechtel, W. & Abrahamsen, A. 1991. Connectionism and the mind: A introduction to parallel processing in networks. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. French translation, le connexionnisme et l'esprit: Introduction au traitement parallele par re seaux, by Joelle Proust, Paris: Editions la Decouverte, 1993.  Second edition in preparation.

Bechtel, W., & Abrahamsen, A.A. 1992 . Connectionism and the future of folk psychology. In (R. Burton, ed) Minds: Natural and Artificial. SUNY Press.

Bechtel, W. & Abrahamsen, A. A. 1993. Connectionism and the future of folk psychology. In R. Burton (Ed.) Minds: Natural and Artificial, pp. 69-100. Albany, NY: SUNY University Press. Reprinted in S. Christensen and D. Turner (Eds.), Fol k psychology: Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1993, pp. 340-367.

Bechtel, W., Mandik, P., Mundale, J., and Stufflebeam, R. S. (eds.) (2001). Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Bechtel, William, Mandik, Pete, and Mundale, Jennifer (2001). Philosophy Meets the Neurosciences. In: Bechtel W, Mandik P, Mundale J, and Stufflebeam RS (eds.) Philosophy and the neurosciences: A reader. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Bechtel, W. and Mundale, J. 1997. Multiple Realizability Revisited. Proceedings of theAustralian Cognitive Science Society.

Bechtel, W. & Richardson, R. C. 1992. Emergent phenomena and complex systems. In A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim (Eds.) Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the prospects of nonreductive physicalism, pp. 257-288. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter Verlag.

Bechtel, W. and Richardson, R. C. 1993. Discovering complexity: Decomposition and localization as strategies in scientific research. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bermudez, J. L. 1995. Non-conceptual content: From perceptual experience to subpersonal computational states. Mind and Language 10:4, pp 333--369.

Bermudez, J. L. 1998. The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Bermudez, J. L., Marcel, A. J., and Eilan, N. (eds.). 1995. The Body and the Self. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Bickle, J. 1996. New wave psychophysical reductionism and the methodological caveats. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56:57-78.

Bickle, J. 1997. Psychoneural Reductionism: The New Wave. MIT Press.

Bickle, J. and Mandik, P. The philosophy of neuroscience. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neuroscience/

Bisiach, E. 1988. The (haunted) brain and consciousness. In (A. Marcel & E. Bisiach, eds)Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.

Block, N. 1998. How to find the neural correlate of consciousness. In (S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak,& A. Scott, eds) Toward a Science of Consciousness 1996. MIT Press.

Borst, C. V. (Ed.). 1970. The mind-brain identity theory. London: MacMillan.

Bub, J. 1994. Testing models of cognition through the analysis of brain-damaged patients. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45:837-55.

Buck, R. 1993. What is this thing called subjective experience? Reflections on the neuropsychology of qualia. Neuropsychology 7: 490-99.

Butler, K. 1992. The physiology of desire. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13:69-88.

Butler, K. 1994 . Neural constraints in cognitive science. Minds and Machines 4:129-62.

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Campbell, K. 1982 . The implications of Land's theory of colour vision. In (L. Cohen, ed) Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 6 North-Holland.

Chalmers, D. On the search for the neural correlate of consciousness.

Chalmers, D. J. 1998. On the search for the neural correlate of consciousness. In (S. Hameroff, A.Kaszniak, & A. Scott, eds) Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.

Chappell, V. C. (Ed.). 1962. The philosophy of mind. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall.

Cherniak, C. 1991. Meta-neuroanatomy: The myth of the unbounded mind/brain. In (E. Agazzi, ed) Philosophy and the Origin and Evolution of the Universe.

Cherniak, C. 1994. Philosophy and computational neuroanatomy. Philosophical Studies, 73: 89-107.

Chrisley, R. 1993. Connectionism, cognitive maps, and the develpoment of objectivity. Artificial Intelligence Review 7: 329-354.

Chrisley, R. 1994. Connectionism, cognitive maps, and the develpoment of objectivity. In Niklasson, L. and Boden, M., eds., Connectionism in a Broad Perspective. London Ellis Horwood: 25-42.

Churchland, P. M. 1979. Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge University Press.

Churchland, P. M. 1981. Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78:67-90. Reprinted in A Neurocomputational Perspective (MIT Press, 1989).

Churchland, P. M. 1982 . Is `thinker' a natural kind? Dialogue 21:223-38.

Churchland, P. M. 1984 . Matter and Consciousness. MIT Press.

Churchland, P. M. 1985. Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states. Journal of Philosophy 82:8-28. Reprinted in A Neurocomputational Perspective (MIT Press, 1989).

Churchland, P. M. 1985. On the speculative nature of our self-conception. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement 11:157-173.

Churchland, P. M. 1986 . Some reductive strategies in cognitive neurobiology. Mind 95:279-309 Reprinted in A Neurocomputational Perspective (MIT Press, 1989) .

Churchland, P. M. 1988 . Perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality: A reply to Jerry Fodor. Philosophy of Science 55:167-87. Reprinted in A Neurocomputational Perspective (MIT Press, 1989) .

Churchland, P. M. 1988. Folk psychology and the explanation of human behavior. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62:209-21. Reprinted in A Neurocomputational Perspective (MIT Press, 1989).

Churchland, P. M. 1989 . On the nature of explanation: A PDP approach. In A Neurocomputational Perspective. MIT Press.

Churchland, P. M. 1989 . On the nature of theories: A neurocomputational perspective. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14. Reprinted in A Neurocomputational Perspective (MIT Press, 1989).

Churchland, P. M. 1989. A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science. MIT Press.

Churchland, P. M. 1989. Knowing qualia: a reply to Jackson. In A Neurocomputational Perspective. MIT Press.

Churchland, P. M. 1993. Evaluating our self-conception. Mind and Language 8:211-22.

Churchland, P. M. 1993. Theory, taxonomy, and methodology: A reply to Haldane's "Understanding folk". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67:313-19.

Churchland, P. M. 1995. The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain. MIT Press.

Churchland, P. M. (2007) On the Reality of Objective Colors, in J. Co- hen and M. Matthen, eds., Color Ontology and Color Science, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Churchland, P. M. & Churchland, P. S.1981. Functionalism, qualia and intentionality. Philosophical Topics 12:121-32. Reprinted in A Neurocomputational Perspective (MIT Press, 1989).

Churchland, P. M. & Churchland, P. S.1983. Stalking the wild epistemic engine. Nous 17:5-20. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition (Basil Blackwell, 1990).

Churchland, P. M. &Churchland, P. S.1990. Could a machine think? Scientific American 262(1):32-37.

Churchland, P. S. 1978 . Fodor on language learning. Synthese 38:149-59.

Churchland, P. S. 1980. Language, thought, and information processing. Nous 14:147-70.

Churchland, P. S. 1980. A perspective on mind-brain research. Journal of Philosophy 77:185-207.

Churchland, P. S. 1981. Is determinism self-refuting? Mind 90:99-101.

Churchland, P. S. 1981. On the alleged backward referral of experience and its relevance to the mind-body problem. Philosophy of Science 48:165-81.

Churchland, P. S. 1982 . Mind-brain reduction: New light from philosophy of science. Neuroscience 7:1041-7.

Churchland, P. S. 1983. Consciousness: the transmutation of a concept. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64:80-95.

Churchland, P. S. 1986 . Neurophilosophy: Toward A Unified Science of the Mind-Brain. MIT Press.

Churchland, P. S. 1987. Epistemology in the age of neuroscience. Journal of Philosophy 84:546-53.

Churchland, P. S. 1988 . Reduction and the neurobiological basis of consciousness. In (A. Marcel & E. Bisiach, eds) Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.

Churchland, P. S. 1994 . Can neurobiology teach us anything about consciousness? Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 67:23-40.

Churchland, P. S. and Grush, R. (to appear) Computation and the Brain.

Churchland, P. S. & Sejnowski, T. 1989 . Neural representation and neural computation. In (L. Nadel, ed) Neural Connections, Mental Computations. MIT Press.

Churchland, P. S., Ramachandran, V.S. 1993. Filling in: Why Dennett is wrong. In (B. Dahlbom, ed) Dennett and His Critics. Basil Blackwell.

Clark, Andy. 1989. Microcognition: Philosophy, Cognitive Science, and Parallel Distributed Processing. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Clark, Andy. 1993. Associative Engines: Connectionism, Concepts, and Representational Change. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Clark, Andy. 1995. I am John's brain. The Journal of Consciousness Studies. 2: 144-148.

Clark, Andy. 1996. Being There. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Clark, Andy. 2001. �Visual Experience and Motor Action: Are The Bonds Too Tight?� Philosophical Review 110:4

Clark, Austen. 1980. Psychological Models and Neural Mechanisms: An Examination of Reductionism in Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Clark, Austen. 1993. Sensory Qualities. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Clark, Austen. forthcoming. Color perception. in A Companion to Cognitive Science, edited by William Bechtel and George Graham. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, forthcoming.

Clark, Austen. Viccissitudes of Consciousness, Varieties of Correlates, American Journal of Psychology, Spring 2003, 128-140. [landscape pdf]

Clark, Austen. Some logical features of feature integration in Werner Backhaus, (ed), Neuronal Coding of Perceptual Systems, . New Jersey: World Scientific, Series on Biophysics and Biocybernetics, vol 9, 2001, ISBN 981-02-4164-X, pp 3-20. [landscape pdf]

Clark, Austen. Qualia and the Psychophysiological Explanation of Color Perception, Synthese, 65 (2), November 1985, 377-405.

Clark, Austen. Seeing and Summing: Implications of Computational Theories of Vision. Cognition and Brain Theory, 7 (1), 1984, 1-23.

Cobb, S. 1952. On the nature and locus of mind. Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry 67:172-7.

Creutzfeld, O. D. 1987. Inevitable deadlocks of the brain-mind discussion. In (B. Gulyas, ed) TheBrain-Mind Problem: Philosophical and Neurophyiological Approaches. Leuven UniversityPress.

Cussins, A. 1990. The connectionist construction of concepts. In M. Boden, ed The Philosophy of AI. Oxford University Press.

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Damasio, A. 1994. Descartes' Error. New York: Putnam.

Davies, M. 1991. Concepts, connectionism, and the language of thought, in Ramsey, Stich, and Rumelhart, (eds.) Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Hillsdale: Erlbaum, pp. 229-256.

Davies, M. and Humphreys, G. (eds.). 1993. Consciousness. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Dennett, D. 1978. Why you can't make a computer that feels pain. Synthese 38. Reprinted in Brainstorms (MIT Press, 1978).

Dennett, D. and Kinsbourne, M. 1992. Time and the observer: the where and when of consciousness in the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 15 (2) : 183-201.

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Edelman, G. 1992. Bright Air, Brilliant Fire. New York. Basic Books.

Eilan, N., McCarthy, R., and Brewer, B. (eds.) 1993. Spatial Representation: Problems in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Blackewell.

Eliasmith, C. 1996. The third contender: A critical examination of the dynamicist theory of cognition. Journal of Philosophical Psychology. Vol. 9 No. 4 pp. 441-463. Reprinted in P. Thagard (ed) (1998) Mind Readings: Introductory Selections in Cognitive Science. MIT Press (html version)

Eliasmith, C. 1997. Computational and Dynamical Models of Mind. Minds and Machines. 7: 531-541. (html version)

Eliasmith, C. 1997. Structure without symbols: Providing a distributed account of high-level cognition. Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. March, 1997, Atlanta, GA. (html version)

Eliasmith, C. 1998. Attractive and In-Discrete: A critique of two putative virutes of the dynamicist theory of mind. Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. April, 1998, New Orleans, LA. Poster version presented at the Society for Philosophy and Psychology June, 1998, Minneapolis, MN. (html version)

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Farber, I. B. & Churchland, P. S. 1995. Consciousness and the neurosciences: Philosophical andtheoretical issues. In (M. Gazzaniga, ed) The Cognitive Neurosciences. MIT Press.

Feigl, H. 1960. Mind-body, not a pseudo-problem. In Borst 1970,33-41. Reprinted from Hook, S. (Ed.). Dimensions of mind: Asymposium. New York: New York University Press, 24-36.

Feyerabend, P. 1962. Explanation, reduction and empiricism. In Feigl, H., & Maxwell, G. (Eds.). Scientific explanation, space andtime: Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science. (Vol. 3).Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 28-97.

Feyerabend, P. 1963. Materialism and the mind-body problem. Review of metaphysics, 17, 49-66.

Feyerabend, P. 1963. Mental events and the brain. Journal of Philosophy, 60, 295-296.

Freeman, W. J. 1997. Three centuries of category errors in studies of the neural basis of consciousness and intentionality. Neural Networks 10:1175-94.

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Gillett, G. 1988. Consciousness and brain function. Philosophical Psychology 1:325-39.

Gillett, G. 1995. Consciousness, thought, and neurological integrity. Journal of Mind and Behavior16:215-33.

Globus, G. 1992. Toward a noncomputational neuroscience. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience. 4 (4): 229-310.

Globus, G. 1996. The Postmodern Brain. John Benjamins Publishing.

Glymour, C. 1994. On the methods of cognitive neuropsychology. British Journal for the Philosophyof Science 45:815-35.

Gordon, G. , Maxwell, G. & Savodnik, I. (eds) 1976. Consciousness and the Brain: A Scientific and Philosophical Inquiry. Plenum

Griffiths, P. 1989. Folk, functional and neurochemical aspects of mood. Philosophical Psychology 2:17-32.

Grush, Rick. Draft. Manifolds, coordinations, imagination, objectivity.

Grush, R. Draft. Perception, imagery, and the sensorimotor loop.

  • A draft, in English, of an article to appear, in German, in Bewusstsein und Repraesentation [Consciousness and Representation], Frank Esken & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann, editors. Verlag Ferdinand Schoeningh, Paderborn, Germany.

Grush, R. 1997. The Architecture of Representation. Philosophical Psychology 10(1)5-23.

Grush, R. & Churchland, P.S. Gaps in Penrose's Toilings. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 2(1):10 - 29. Also to appear in Conscious Experience Thomas Metzinger, ed. 1996 Allen Press. A version in German will appear in Bewu�tsein, edited by Thomas Metzinger.

Grush, Rick and Mandik, Pete. (2002). Representational Parts. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 1 (4): 389-394.

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Hardcastle, V. G. 1992. Reduction, explanatory extension, and the mind/brain sciences. Philosophy of Science 59:408-28.

Hardcastle, V. G. 1993. The naturalists versus the skeptics: The debate over a scientific understanding of consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 14:27-50.

Hardcastle, V. G. 1994. Psychology's binding problem and possible neurobiological solutions. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 1,1: 66-90.

Hardcastle, V. G. 1995. Locating Consciousness. John Benjamins.

Hardcastle, V. G. 1995. A critique of information theories of consciousness. Mind and Machines: Journal for Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy, and Cognitive Science, 5, 1: 89-107.

Hardcastle, V. G. The why of consciousness: a non-issue for materialists. Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 7-13. Reprinted in Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem. (1997) J. Shear (ed.). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, pp. 61-68.

Hardcastle, V. G. 1996. Discovering the moment of consciousness? I: Bridging techniques at work,& II: An ERP analysis of priming using novel visual stimuli. Philosophical Psychology 9:149-96.

Hardcastle, V. G. 1996. How to Build a Theory in Cognitive Science. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.

Hardcastle, V. G. 1996. How we get there from here: dissolution of the binding problem. Journal of Mind and Behavior, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 251-266.

Hardcastle, V. G. 1997. When a pain is not. Journal of Philosophy.Vol. XCIV, No. 8: 381-409.

Hardcastle, V. G. forthcoming. A Pain by Any Other Name. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Hardcastle, V. G. forthcoming. What we don't know about the brain. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences.

Hardcastle, V. G. forthcoming. The puzzle of attention, the importance of metaphor. Philosophical Psychology

Hardin, C. L. 1985. A transparent case for subjectivism. Analysis 45: 117-9.

Hardin, C. L. 1988 . Color for Philosophers. Hackett.

Hardin, C. L. 1992. Physiology, phenomenology, and Spinoza's true colors. In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter.

Hatfield, G. 1988 . Neurophilosophy meets psychology: Reduction, autonomy, and empirical constraints. Cognitive Neuropsychology 5:723-46.

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Ivanitsky A. M. 1993. Consciousness: criteria and possible mechanisms. International Journal of Psychophysiology 14:179-87.

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Keeley, B. forthcoming Fixing content and function in neurobiologicalsystems: The neuroethology of electroreception. Biology & Philosophy.

Kinsbourne, M. 1997. What qualifies a representation for a role in consciousness? In (J. Cohen &J. Schooler, eds) Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.

Klagge, J. C. 1989 . Wittgenstein and neuroscience. Synthese 78:319-43.

Kobes, B. 1991. On a model for psycho-neural coevolution. Behavior and Philosophy 19:1-17.

Kohler, A. (2003). Wittgenstein meets neuroscience. A review of Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience by M. R. Bennett and P. M. S. Hacker. Human Nature Review. 3: 459-460.

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Lahav, R. 1993. What neuropsychology tells us about consciousness. Philosophy of Science 60:67-85.

Lahav, R. 1997. The conscious and the nonconscious: Philosophical implications of neuropsychology. In (M. Carrier & P. Machamer, eds) Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press.

Landreth, A. (2003). Review of Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy by Patricia Smith Churchland. Human Nature Review. 3: 455-458.

Legg, C. R. 1988 . Connectionism and physiological psychology: A marriage made in heaven? Philosophical Psychology 1:263-78.

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Lyons. W. 1995. A brain's-eye view of intentionality. chapter six of: Approaches to Intentionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Madell, G. 1986 . Neurophilosophy: A principled skeptic's response. Inquiry.

Malcolm, N. 1977. The causal role of the neural representation. chapter nine of Memory and Mind. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Mandik, Pete. (1998a) Objectivity Without Space. The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy, Special Issue on the Philosophy of Gareth Evans.. http://ejap.louisiana.edu/EJAP/1998/mandik98.html

Mandik, Pete. (1998b) Handlung und Erfahrung: Ueber die konstitutive Rolle motorischer Kontrolle bei der Erzeugung raeumlicher Qualia [Action and Experience: On the Constitutive Role of Motor Control in the Generation of Spatial Qualia]. In Bewusstsein und Repraesentation [Consciousness and Representation] (eds.) Heinz-Dieter Heckman and Frank Esken. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh.

Mandik, Pete. (1999) Qualia, Space, and Control. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1): 47-60.

Mandik, Pete. (2001a) Mental Representation and the Subjectivity of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 14 (2): 179-202.

Mandik, Pete. (2001b) Points of View from the Brain's Eye View: Subjectivity and Neural Representation. Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. (Eds.) William Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale, and Robert Stufflebeam, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Mandik, Pete. (2002). Synthetic Neuroethology. Metaphilosophy. 33 (1-2): 11-29. Reprinted in CyberPhilosophy: The Intersection of Philosophy and Computing, James H. Moor and Terrell Ward Bynum, (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, 2002.

Mandik, Pete. (2003). Varieties of Representation in Evolved and Embodied Neural Networks. Biology and Philosophy. 18 (1): 95-130.

Mandik, Pete. (2005a). Action Oriented Representation. In: Brook, Andrew and Akins, Kathleen (eds.) Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mandik, Pete. (2005b) Phenomenal Consciousness and the Allocentric-Egocentric Interface. In: R. Buccheri et al. (eds.); Endophysics, Time, Quantum and the Subjective World Scientific Publishing Co.

Mandik, Pete. (2006) The Introspectability of Brain States as Such. In: Keeley, Brian (ed.) Paul M. Churchland: Contemporary Philosophy in Focus Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mandik, Pete. (in progress, under contract). The Neurophilosophy of Consciousness. In: Velman, Max and Schneider, Susan (eds.) The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Mandik, Pete. (in press). L'accomplissement Neural de L'objectivit� [The Neural Accomplishment of Objectivity]. In: Ennen, Elizabeth, Poirier, Pierre, Faucher, Luc, and Racine, Eric (eds.) Des Neurones � la Philosophie: Neurophilosophie et philosophie des neurosciences [From Neurons to Philosophy: Neurophilosophy and philosophy of the neurosciences]. Paris: DeBoeck Universit�.

Mandik, Pete and Brook, Andrew. (2005). Introduction. In: Brook, Andrew and Akins, Kathleen (eds.) Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mandik, Pete and Clark, Andy. (2002). Selective Representing and World Making. Minds and Machines 12(3): 383-395.

Mandik, Pete, Collins, Mike, and Vereschagin, Alex. (in press). Evolving Artificial Minds and Brains. In: Andrea Schalley and Drew Khlentzos (eds.) Mental States: Nature, Function, Evolution. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishers.

Manier, E. 1986. Problems in the development of cognitive neuroscience: Effective communication between scientific domains. Philosophy of Science Association 1986, 1:183-97.

McCauley, R. 1986 . Intertheoretic relations and the future of psychology. Philosophy of Science 53:179-99.

McCauley, R. N. 1993. Why the blind can't lead the blind: Dennett on the blind spot, blindsight, and sensory qualia. Consciousness and Cognition 2:155-64.

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Mundale, J. and Bechtel, W. 1996. Integrating Neuroscience, Psychology, and Evolutionary Biology Through a Teleological Conception of Function, Minds and Machines, 6, 481-505. (This is available as a postscript file.)

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Newton, N. 1991. Consciousness, qualia, and reentrant signalling. Behavior and Philosophy 19: 21-41.

Nagel, T. 1971. Brain bisection and the unity of consciousness. Synthese 22:396-413 Reprinted in Mortal Questions (Cambridge University Press, 1979).

Nelkin, N. 1986. Pains and pain sensations. Journal of Philosophy 83:129-48.

Nelkin, N. 1994 . Reconsidering pain. Philosophical Psychology 7:325-43.

Nelkin, N. 1995. The dissociation of phenomenal states from apperception. In (T. Metzinger, ed) Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.

Nelson, R. 1989 . Philosophical issues in Edelman's neural darwinism. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 1:195-208.

Nikolinakos, D. 1994. General anesthesia, consciousness, and the skeptical challenge. Journal of Philosophy 2:88-104.

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O'Keefe, J. & Nadel, L. 1978. The Hippocampus as a Cognitive Map. Oxford, Clarendon Press.

O'Keefe, J. 1993. Kant and the sea-horse: an essay in the neurophilosophy of space. In Eilan, N., McCarthy, R., and Brewer, B. (eds.) 1993. Spatial Representation: Problems in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Blackewell.

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Piccinini, G. "Computational Modeling vs. Computational Explanation: Is Everything a Turing Machine, and Does It Matter to the Philosophy of Mind?" Forthcoming in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2007). (38 pp. typescript.)

Piccinini, G. "The First Computational Theory of Mind and Brain: A Close Look at McCulloch and Pitts's 'Logical Calculus of Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity'," Synthese, 141.2 (2004), pp. 175-215.

Piccinini, G. "Computational Explanation and Mechanistic Explanation of Mind," forthcoming in Cartographies of the Mind: The Interface between Philosophy and Cognitive Science, M. de Caro, F. Ferretti, and M. Marraffa, eds., Dordrecht: Kluwer. (26 pp. typescript.)

Place, U. T. 1956. Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology 47:44-50. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition (Basil Blackwell, 1990).

Place, U. T. 1988. Thirty years on -- Is consciousness still a brain process? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66:208-19.

Popper, K. & Eccles, J. 1977 . The Self and Its Brain. Springer.

Puccetti, R. 1973 . Brain bisection and personal identity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24:339-55.

Puccetti, R. 1981. The case for mental duality: Evidence from split-brain data and other considerations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4:93-123.

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Pete Mandik