The applicability of AEI (the Allocentric-Egocentric Interface theory of consciousness) to motor systems looks to be a relatively straightforward affair. First, motor systems are arranged hierarchically. Focusing here just on cortex, the highest level is in prefrontal cortex, the lowest level in primary motor cortex, and relatively intermediate is premotor cortex. Further, there exist both forward projections and back projections between successive levels of the motor hierarchy (Churchland, 2002, p. 72). We may further characterize levels in the motor hierarchy as differing along an allocentric-egocentric dimension.
The neuroanatomical features of the motor system make it quite natural to suppose that both intermediacy and recurrence can apply to motor processing. The basic suggestion here is twofold. First, unconscious action involves motor signals originating in relatively high levels and propagating down to lower levels without any recurrence from lower to higher. Second, the conscious aspect of conscious action is to be identified with states consisting in reciprocally interacting pairs of motor representations where one member of the pair is relatively more allocentric than the other.
While the application of AEI to control consciousness is not an instance of what I have called a pure motor theory, since not just any outgoing motor signaling counts as conscious, it is still clearly an instance of a motor theory, since it allows for conscious control to arise without any sensory input or imagery thereof.
It is perhaps worth briefly noting a mapping between the basic elements of pseudo-closed-loop control and the AEI account of control consciousness. Outgoing signals from the highest levels of the hierarchy may be identified with the specification of a goal state. The next lowest level receives the goal states and sends on the inverse mapping. This inverse mapping may be sent to lowest levels eventuating in command signals. But it, or more precisely, a copy of it, may be sent down to intermediate areas wherein activation is utilized as a forward model with results that may be propagated back up to higher levels.
A sensory theory of control consciousness may seem to lead to an overall more parsimonious view of the mind than a motor theory. The thought here is something like the following. Since it seems difficult to deny that at least some consciousness is sensory consciousness, the sensory theory, in holding that all consciousness is sensory, leads to a simpler view than the motor account. Proponents of a motor account of control consciousness seem, on the face of it, to need to commit to two different accounts of consciousness: one for sensory consciousness and one for control consciousness. But with AEI on hand, it is easy to see that a motor theory of control consciousness need not lead to a less parsimonious view. A single coherent account of consciousness applies to both sensory consciousness and control consciousness: conscious states are constituted by patterns of recurrent activation in intermediate levels of processing hierarchies.