Comments on: Free Dennett http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2008/01/14/free-dennett/ Pete Mandik's Intermittently Neurophilosophical Weblog Mon, 15 Mar 2010 06:06:14 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.7.1 hourly 1 By: Gary Williams http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2008/01/14/free-dennett/comment-page-1/#comment-150003 Gary Williams Thu, 17 Jan 2008 21:43:05 +0000 http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2008/01/14/free-dennett/#comment-150003 Thanks for the link to that Bechtel paper, Eric. It was very level-headed and convincing. I liked how he emphasized that the two approaches are "complementary". I think I am coming around on the concept of representation in terms of explanatory usefulness. Thanks for the link to that Bechtel paper, Eric. It was very level-headed and convincing. I liked how he emphasized that the two approaches are “complementary”.

I think I am coming around on the concept of representation in terms of explanatory usefulness.

]]> By: Pete Mandik http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2008/01/14/free-dennett/comment-page-1/#comment-149801 Pete Mandik Thu, 17 Jan 2008 11:52:06 +0000 http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2008/01/14/free-dennett/#comment-149801 Thanks, Eric. I was at Wash U with Bill Bechtel, Andy Clark, Rick Grush, and Chris Eliasmith and we were all writing our criticisms of dynamacism around the same time. Thanks, Eric. I was at Wash U with Bill Bechtel, Andy Clark, Rick Grush, and Chris Eliasmith and we were all writing our criticisms of dynamacism around the same time.

]]> By: Eric Thomson http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2008/01/14/free-dennett/comment-page-1/#comment-149728 Eric Thomson Thu, 17 Jan 2008 07:59:49 +0000 http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2008/01/14/free-dennett/#comment-149728 Ah, OK, <a href="http://mechanism.ucsd.edu/~bill/research/REPRESENT.html" rel="nofollow">here is Bechtel's paper</a> on the topic. Ah, OK, here is Bechtel’s paper on the topic.

]]> By: Eric Thomson http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2008/01/14/free-dennett/comment-page-1/#comment-149727 Eric Thomson Thu, 17 Jan 2008 07:56:41 +0000 http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2008/01/14/free-dennett/#comment-149727 Interesting. I didn't know the dynamical-systems-is-right-therefore-no-representations-needed people still existed. I always thought the consensus after the initial van Gelder hubub was that giving a dynamical systems analysis of X is compatible with giving an analysis of X as trading in representations. Even the Watt governor can be given a representational and dynamical spin at the same time I though (Bechtel argued this at some talk I went to years ago, and I remember being convinced). Nice articles BTW. It will help me as I write up my criticism of the 'there is no cartesian theatre' jive. Interesting. I didn’t know the dynamical-systems-is-right-therefore-no-representations-needed people still existed. I always thought the consensus after the initial van Gelder hubub was that giving a dynamical systems analysis of X is compatible with giving an analysis of X as trading in representations. Even the Watt governor can be given a representational and dynamical spin at the same time I though (Bechtel argued this at some talk I went to years ago, and I remember being convinced).

Nice articles BTW. It will help me as I write up my criticism of the ‘there is no cartesian theatre’ jive.

]]> By: Pete Mandik http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2008/01/14/free-dennett/comment-page-1/#comment-149426 Pete Mandik Wed, 16 Jan 2008 22:30:14 +0000 http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2008/01/14/free-dennett/#comment-149426 I'm well aware of that stuff. I think it's terrible. It needs to simultaneously be demonstrated (1) that the rabbits have intentional phenomena in the first place (since you are not a rabbit who does autophenomenology, good luck doing that without doing heterophenomenology) and (2) that a real explanation (not a sketch) can be given that isn't straightforwardly translatable into a representational one. Here's more by me on this sort of stuff: http://www.petemandik.com/philosophy/papers/emb.pdf http://www.petemandik.com/philosophy/papers/aor.html I’m well aware of that stuff. I think it’s terrible. It needs to simultaneously be demonstrated (1) that the rabbits have intentional phenomena in the first place (since you are not a rabbit who does autophenomenology, good luck doing that without doing heterophenomenology) and (2) that a real explanation (not a sketch) can be given that isn’t straightforwardly translatable into a representational one.

Here’s more by me on this sort of stuff:

http://www.petemandik.com/philosophy/papers/emb.pdf

http://www.petemandik.com/philosophy/papers/aor.html

]]> By: Gary Williams http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2008/01/14/free-dennett/comment-page-1/#comment-149407 Gary Williams Wed, 16 Jan 2008 22:09:29 +0000 http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2008/01/14/free-dennett/#comment-149407 Oh, and thanks for the link to that paper from Glymour. Very interesting. Oh, and thanks for the link to that paper from Glymour. Very interesting.

]]> By: Gary Williams http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2008/01/14/free-dennett/comment-page-1/#comment-149400 Gary Williams Wed, 16 Jan 2008 21:59:13 +0000 http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2008/01/14/free-dennett/#comment-149400 For Shaun Gallagher's sake, I should have finished the quote which in full said: "...nothing other than a place-holder for an explanation that needs to be cast in dynamical terms of an embodied, environmentally embedded, and enactive model." With that said, I don't know to what extent Gallagher actually endorses the dynamic systems approach in addition to the standard enactive approach, so hopefully I didn't mischaracterize his position. As for no one producing an explanation of intentional phenomena in dynamic system theoretic terms, Dreyfus seems to think that Walter Freeman has sketched out how Merleau-Ponty's intentional arc could work in dynamical terms with his work on rabbits. See section 7 of Dreyfus's "Why Heideggerian AI Failed and How Fixing it Would Require Making it More Heideggerian" http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a777583844~db=all~jumptype=rss For Shaun Gallagher’s sake, I should have finished the quote which in full said: “…nothing other than a place-holder for an explanation that needs to be cast in dynamical terms of an embodied, environmentally embedded, and enactive model.” With that said, I don’t know to what extent Gallagher actually endorses the dynamic systems approach in addition to the standard enactive approach, so hopefully I didn’t mischaracterize his position.

As for no one producing an explanation of intentional phenomena in dynamic system theoretic terms, Dreyfus seems to think that Walter Freeman has sketched out how Merleau-Ponty’s intentional arc could work in dynamical terms with his work on rabbits. See section 7 of Dreyfus’s “Why Heideggerian AI Failed and How Fixing it Would Require Making it More Heideggerian”

http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a777583844~db=all~jumptype=rss

]]> By: Pete Mandik http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2008/01/14/free-dennett/comment-page-1/#comment-149373 Pete Mandik Wed, 16 Jan 2008 20:33:15 +0000 http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2008/01/14/free-dennett/#comment-149373 Unfortunately, since no one has actually produced an explanation of intentional phenomena in dynamic system theoretic terms, Gallagher's invocation of DST comes across as more wishful thinking than a convincing challenge to representationalism. Nice and thorough critiques of dynamicism are available from Rick Grush and Chris Eliasmith, but one of my favorite ones is this one from Clark Glymour: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000139/ Unfortunately, since no one has actually produced an explanation of intentional phenomena in dynamic system theoretic terms, Gallagher’s invocation of DST comes across as more wishful thinking than a convincing challenge to representationalism.

Nice and thorough critiques of dynamicism are available from Rick Grush and Chris Eliasmith, but one of my favorite ones is this one from Clark Glymour:

http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000139/

]]> By: Gary Williams http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2008/01/14/free-dennett/comment-page-1/#comment-149320 Gary Williams Wed, 16 Jan 2008 18:28:29 +0000 http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2008/01/14/free-dennett/#comment-149320 Pete, Thank you for the link to your reply to Dreyfus, it was very informative. In the examples you used, such as chess playing, I agree that Dreyfus goes a little overboard in his anti-representationalism campaign. However, I do think that when it comes to pure action, anti-representationalism is the preferred way to go. As Shaun Gallagher says, when it comes to action, "representation is nothing other than a place-holder for an explanation that needs to be cast in dynamical terms...and if one can explain the phenomena in non-representationalist terms, then the concept of representation is at best redundant" See: http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/~gallaghr/gall07ijps.pdf Pete,

Thank you for the link to your reply to Dreyfus, it was very informative. In the examples you used, such as chess playing, I agree that Dreyfus goes a little overboard in his anti-representationalism campaign. However, I do think that when it comes to pure action, anti-representationalism is the preferred way to go. As Shaun Gallagher says, when it comes to action, “representation is nothing other than a place-holder for an explanation that needs to be cast in dynamical terms…and if one can explain the phenomena in non-representationalist terms, then the concept of representation is at best redundant”

See:
http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/~gallaghr/gall07ijps.pdf

]]> By: Pete Mandik http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2008/01/14/free-dennett/comment-page-1/#comment-149314 Pete Mandik Wed, 16 Jan 2008 17:46:13 +0000 http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2008/01/14/free-dennett/#comment-149314 Hi Gary, Thank you for your comments and questions. To your first question, yes, and to your second, yes if "egocentric content" is replaced with "conceptualized egocentric content". To your third question, I have no clear idea what you or Dreyfus think the ego is or how you can tell when it is and isn't involved in anything, but if you want to get a sense of what I think egocentricity amounts to, you can take a look at the following, especially around pp. 160-162. http://www.petemandik.com/philosophy/papers/Ch06-TheSubjectiveBrain-Draft4_2.pdf And if you're further interested in what I think sucks about Dreyfus on motor intentionality, you can take a look at a paper by me and Rick Grush that also appeared in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences and is available here: http://www.petemandik.com/philosophy/papers/repparts.pdf Hi Gary,

Thank you for your comments and questions.

To your first question, yes, and to your second, yes if “egocentric content” is replaced with “conceptualized egocentric content”.

To your third question, I have no clear idea what you or Dreyfus think the ego is or how you can tell when it is and isn’t involved in anything, but if you want to get a sense of what I think egocentricity amounts to, you can take a look at the following, especially around pp. 160-162.
http://www.petemandik.com/philosophy/papers/Ch06-TheSubjectiveBrain-Draft4_2.pdf

And if you’re further interested in what I think sucks about Dreyfus on motor intentionality, you can take a look at a paper by me and Rick Grush that also appeared in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences and is available here:
http://www.petemandik.com/philosophy/papers/repparts.pdf

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