Embodiment in Consciousness and Realism

Two newish papers on embodiment caught my eye whilst auto-googling the other day.

Jesse Prinz, in his “Is Consciousness Embodied?“, discusses, among other things, my “Qualia, Space, and Control“. Do motor outputs play constitutive roles in the contents of conscious experiences? To put things very simply: Mandik says “yes”, Prinz says “no”.

Tony Chemero, in his “Toward a Situated, Embodied Realism“, discusses, among other things, a paper I wrote with Andy Clark, “Selective Representing and World Making“. Is realism consistent with embodied approaches to cognition? To put things very simply: Mandik and Clark say “yes, definitely” and Chemero, who used to say “no” now seems to say “yes, sorta”.

Descartes

One Response to “Embodiment in Consciousness and Realism”

  1. Anibal says:

    There is a lot debate about where exacly place the boundary or draw a line between sensory stimuly and it´s influence subsequently in the motor cortex [e.g. the two classics streams of vision: vision for perception vison for action( ventral stream and dorsal stream) and even one more subdivison within the dorsal stream called dorso-dorsal stream involve in the perception of space only, Mattelli and Luppino 2001) and another circuit related to the description of pragmatic characteritics of objects to be grasped (AIP, anterior intraparietal area)], but what is clear is that once sensory stimuly enters, there is some overlap with the motor cortex, and the later can use sensory stimuli to produce an effcient outcome.
    In so doing, the traditional direction of influence from consciousness to action is reverse as well, from action to consciousness, i think.