Brain Hammer

Zombie Pete

Originally uploaded by Pete Mandik

“Transcending Zombies,” available here, is the fifth chapter of The Subjective Brain as well as the basis for my talk on July 5 at the CUNY Grad Center.
Excerpt:
The argument that I will be developing in the remainder of this chapter, and referring to as the Transcending Zombies argument or simply TZ, goes as follows.

P1. If it is possible for me to know that I am not a zombie, then phenomenal character is (a certain kind of) conceptualized egocentric content.
P2. I know that I am not a zombie.
P3. Phenomenal character is (a certain kind of) conceptualized egocentric content.
P4. Fixing my physical properties fixes my conceptualized egocentric contents.
C. Fixing my physical properties fixes my phenomenal properties.

I turn now to the sections wherein I defend P1 of TZ. In §3 I defend the claim that my knowing that I’m not a zombie requires that if I have (states with) phenomenal character right now then my current conceptual repertoire is adequate for representing that phenomenal character. In §4, I defend the claim that my knowing that I’m not a zombie requires that if I have (states with) phenomenal character right now, then I have states with egocentric content. In §5 I defend the claim that if I know that I am not a zombie, then not only does my having (states with) phenomenal character require that I have states with conceptual and egocentric contents, but certain states with conceptual and egocentric contents must suffice for my having (states with) phenomenal character. Further, in §5, I begin a case (to be completed in §§7-8) that (if I know that I’m not a zombie then) certain conceptualized egocentric contents are identical to (not just necessary and sufficient for) phenomenal character.

Treehead Series - Inheritance

Originally uploaded by redhousepainter

All representations have contents. Even representations of things that don’t exist are meaningfully described as “representations of something”. But not all representations are representations of themselves. Compare, for instance, the sentences “The cat is on the mat” and “This sentence has seven words in it”. Compare also, the thought that “Cherries grow on trees” and “I like thinking about thinking”.

While there may be a sense in which a representation ‘s content is a property of the representation, representing the content doesn’t suffice for representing the representation. All representations represent their contents, since their contents just are what they represent. But not all representations are representations of themselves. So whatever does suffice for representing a representation, it cannot simply be representing its content. If all properties of representations that aren’t content properties are vehicular properties, then whatever does suffice for representing a representation, it must include representing its vehicular properties.

States in which we are conscious of something bear sufficient similarities to representation to warrant postulating that such states are implemented by mental representations. What’s postulated, then, is that being conscious of something is just a certain kind of mentally representing something –that the content of consciousness just is a kind of representational content. It won’t follow from this implementation story without further argument, though, that all states in which we are conscious of something are automatically states in virtue of which we are conscious of those states. Nor will it follow without further argument that simply by being conscious of the state’s content are we thereby conscious of the state itself.