Subjective Brain Ch. 2
The next chapter of The Subjective Brain is up: Ch. 2, Introspecting Brain States as Such.
If the neuro-reductionism of the previous chapter is true, then also true is the following thesis about introspection: when we introspect our conscious states, what we introspect are actually brain states. However, if we can’t in fact introspect brain states, then that fact, the alleged non-introspectibility of brain states, would count against neuro-reductionism.
One point about introspection that even a neuro-reductionist must grant is that when we introspect it doesn’t usually seem like we are introspecting brain states. Now, if it is additionally true that how conscious states are is identical to how conscious states seem, and it is further true that conscious states never (not just usually, but in no possible situation) seem like brain states, then those propositions would form the bases for a very powerful case against neuro-reductionism.
In this chapter, I plan to defend neuro-reductionism against such a threat.
Detail from the cover of Zap Comics #8 by Robert Crumb
June 1st, 2007 at 7:20 am
Nice pic!
So, it seems to me that your discussionof transparency here suffers fromthe same kind of problem that it did over in our discussion of this stuff over at Philosophy Sucks! (yes there is an ‘!’ in the title…) A Tale of Two T’s
You say that transparancy is the claim that when I have a conscious experience all I am aware of is what the experience is of, but that is the conclusion of an argument which goes something like.
1. when I introspect all I am aware of is what my expereinces are of
2. the way the experience seems to me is the way that it is
3. therefore Transparancy as you have worded it
In other owrds the argument is “it seems to be true, so it is”.
I have suggested that transparancy really is 1. and not 3. and I think the quotes from Tye and Dretske back my claim up. If this is right then there is no tension between the two T’s. This is clear from the way you put the problem.
You seem to be assuming that we must be conscious of being conscious of the first-order state. But that is not what transitivity claims. So when we have a conscious first order state we will be cosncious of that state but that does not mean that we will be consciously conscious of it, and so does not require that we notice any vehicleular properties. On the other hand by being conscious of the state we become conscious of its content and so someone like me can endorse both of the claims that you say are mutually exclusive.
I’ll read the rest of the chapter later…
June 1st, 2007 at 7:58 am
“You seem to be assuming that we must be conscious of being conscious of the first-order state.”
What makes you think I am assuming that?
June 1st, 2007 at 8:01 am
If “by being conscious of the state we become conscious of its content” means we become conscious of only it’s content, then as argued in the chapter (in an argument attributed to Guzeldere), the so-called higher-order state is really just a first-order state.
June 1st, 2007 at 8:03 am
“I think the quotes from Tye and Dretske back my claim up”
They are consistent with your claim. They don’t, however, prove the superiority of your claim over mine. Also, you have to account for Moore and Harman too.
June 1st, 2007 at 8:33 am
Re 1: because why else would you think that we should have conscious access to the vehicular properties of the first order state?
Re 2: I become conscious of myself as being in a state with that content and thereby have mental access to the objects out there in the world. To take an example, when having a conscious experience of red I become conscious of myself as seeing red. That is a higher-order state, but all that it makes me conscious of is the seeing of red, which is what it means to have a conscious experience of red.
Re 3: The Moore quote is even more obviously talking about introspection and so is Harman’s…
The problem here is that you, and all these guys too, start of talking about a conscious experience full stop, and then in the next breath are talking about introspection of conscious states as though you have not changed the subject.
June 1st, 2007 at 9:11 am
Re: 1, Huh?
Re: 2, you fail to dodge the Guzeldere argument. If you are conscious of more than the content of the first order state, if you are, as you say, “conscious of myself as being in a state with that content”, then you would have to thereby be conscious of vehicular properties of that state. The only properties the state has are vehicular ones and content ones. If you are conscious of more than the content ones, then blammo, you are conscious of the vehicular ones.
Re: 3, so what?
June 1st, 2007 at 9:24 am
1. that means that you do not think that you have to consciously conscious of the experience?
2. I wasn’t trying to ‘dodge’ the argument. I was trying to say that the properties of the vehicle are not themselves conscious, what is conscious is the content, how that comes about is by being conscious of the vehicle in respect of its content
3. What are you so what-ing about? The distinction between a conscious state and my introspection of it? Surey you must recognize this distinction! Or are you so-what-ing the Moore and Harman stuff? If so, then the point is that the claim they are making is 1. above not 3. which you can’t ’so what’
June 1st, 2007 at 11:50 am
1. Contra what you and the other HOT-heads assert, there’s no difference between being conscious of x and being consciously conscious of x.
2. What is conscious is the content? So, if the content is that there is a cat on the mat, then the cat on the mat becomes conscious? Weird! Here I thought what was supposed to be conscious was a state of a person.
3. I’m so-whating that Moore and Harman are talking about introspection. So what if they mention introspection? That alone doesn’t prove that the transparency thesis is what you say it is.
June 1st, 2007 at 12:55 pm
Re 1: Ahh..that’s called begging the question…so how do youexplainwhat’s going on in subliminal perception if it is not a case of something being unconscious and at the same time being conscious of something?
2. Since you beg the question against one, you naturally don’t see what I am trying to say here, but it is nothing like the silly thing you attribute to me.
3. Doesn’t the fact that everyone who like transparancy says that it is my way prove that no one thinks it is your way? And you still haven’t told me whether you think there is a difference between a conscious state and an introspected conscious state…
June 1st, 2007 at 1:04 pm
Let me re-word that last bit.
The quotes you provide are consitent with the way that you have worded transparancy, and they are consistent withthe way that I have worded it, so at the very least you have failed to show that transparancy is the way you claim it is and so failed to show that there is a tensionbetween the two T’s, regardless of whether or not my claim is right (which it is)
June 1st, 2007 at 1:27 pm
Re 1, Easy. But you’re going to have to wait for chapters 4 and 6.
Re Transparency, I haven’t just provided a bunch of quotes. I’ve also provided some reasons for believing why I interpret them correctly . Harman takes transparency as a premise in an argument against the existence of qualia as intrinsic properties of experience. Tye and Dretske take transparency as a premise in their arguments for first order representationalism. Also, it constitutes their main premise against Transitivity. Transparency could not play a role as a plausible premise in any of those arguments if it is intended to be the thesis you say it is. Of course, maybe you’re right and Tye, Dretske, and Harman are imbeciles.
Anyway, when you see the next chapter, you are going to see that my ultimate conclusion about Transparency (namely, that the only good Transparency is what I call “Deflationary Transparency”) is so close to your interpretation of plain-old Transparency that this fight has been relatively pointless.
June 1st, 2007 at 2:18 pm
Fine, I’ll wait…
I don’t think they are imbeciles (quit) but what I do think is that they implicitly assume the argument I laid ot in 1. 2. and 3. in my first comment and that they are wrong to do so because we can reject 2. And the quotes, and your faith that they are not imbeciles, is not enough to establish 3.
Aren’t they all?
June 2nd, 2007 at 6:58 am
Here is a quote from Tye’s paper ‘Representationalism and the Transapency of Experience’
Notice how he defines transparent in terms of one focusing on or introspecting one’s mental states…he is not making a claim about conscious states but about our introspection of those conscious states…is there anyone who endorses what you call transparency who says that they do?
June 2nd, 2007 at 7:14 am
One last thing,
I think that you have misidentified the (alleged) conflict between transparency and transitivity…you claim that transparency is a claim about conscious states and so conflicts with transitivity as a platitude about the nature of conscious mental states.
I claim that transparency is a claim about our introspection of our conscious mental states. Transparency is supposed to show that when we introspect our mental states we don’t find anything like what transitivity requires…if transparency were the way you say it is it could not play the role in the argument for first-order representationalism that Tye, Dretske, a company want it to…
June 3rd, 2007 at 5:49 am
You seem to be pointlessly hung up on the word “Transparency”.
I can let you use it whatever way you want and reserve “Shmansparency” for the thing I’ve been talking about all along. Shamnsparency is something one has to embrace if one embraces FOR (see the argument attributed to Kind), and is commonly embraced by those, like Dretske and Tye, who reject HORs and Transitivity.
Alternately, we could cast the disagreement in terms of the vocabulary Kind introduces of Strong and Weak Transparency.
Either way, I don’t see that it matters much, since at the end of the day you and I will agree thet the sorts of things FOR theorists cite as their evidence aren’t strong enough to establish FOR.
June 4th, 2007 at 3:52 am
Pete, you are funny!
Consider an analogy: Suppose I said that the transitivity principle was the claim that when we introspect our experience we are conscious of ourselves as being in some mental state and then you come along and tell me (quite rightly) that the transitivity principle is not a claim about introspection but about the nature of conscious states. If I were to respond in the manner that you just did, saying that this is just a verbal issue and that you were ‘pointlessly hung up’ on the word ‘transitivity’ you would start to wonder if I had read and understood those philosophers who claim to believe in transitivity…that is the situation as I see it. It is ot that I am hung up on the word, it is that you are using a word non-standardly andpretending that it is standard (someties called constructing a straw man).
The distinction that Kind makes between string and weak transpaency does not help you, as she is very clearly talking about introspective access to our experience. Strong transparency is the claim that we can NEVER become aware of features of our experience via introspection, weak transparancy is the claim that it is difficult but not impossible to become aware of features of our experience in introspection…
I agree that you can use words in any way that you want, but to help readers it would be nice if you noted that you were not using the word in the same way that Tye, Dretske, and everyone else in the philosophy of mind/conscious rackett, uses it…And I know that we will end up agreeing as you say, but this point is important to me because I want to be able to say that both transpaency and transitivity are true and is transpaency is what you say that it is I can’t (good thing that is not what it is ;^)
June 4th, 2007 at 4:07 am
Oh I almost forgot,
You still have not addressed my charge that you are confusing the question “what is a conscious state?” (answer: the two T’s as you have worded them) with “what am I conscious of in introspection?” which is even more crucial for the section ‘neuro-inspection and transparency’ at the very least you need to say something about the relation between these two (seemingly) very different questions…
June 4th, 2007 at 4:14 am
“she is very clearly talking about introspective access to our experience”
As I’ve said before when you make this sort of point: so what? So what if introspection gets mentioned while talking about the transparency of experience? What is it that you are trying to convince me of? That people who reject HOR and Transitivity and embrace FOR don’t have something like Shmansparency in mind? If so, it’s not working.
June 4th, 2007 at 4:31 am
Regarding “what is a conscious state?” there are three kinds of answers typically given (WIL, and the two T’s, see Ch. 0). Transparecy get hammered on in ch 2. It will get a further beating, and so will Transitivity, in ch. 3. A positive answer is developed through chs 4, 5, and 6.
June 4th, 2007 at 4:44 am
The point I am try to make is that transparency, as standardly understood in the literature, is a claim about what happens when we introspect our conscious mental states. Introspection does not merely ‘get mentioned’ when talking about transparency, it is used to say what the author means by the word ‘transparent’ and what they mean is that when we introspect we ’see’ right through the experience to what the experience is of. When we introspect we do not find the experience itself, but only what the experience is an experience of. This is very different from what YOU mean by transparency. You have it as a claim about conscious states, but it is not. It is a claim about introspection that is used as a premise in an argument for a certain view of conscious states.
I do not deny that they have something like shmansparency in mind, as I have said, I think something like that is thought, by them, to follow from transparency and that is why transparency is often a premise in FOR-head arguments. But you shouldn’t claim, as you do, that shmansparency is transparency. You should instead claim that transparency is part of an argument for shmansparency which ultimately doesn’t work. THAT is what I am trying to convince you of.
June 4th, 2007 at 5:00 am
That last thing you wrote doesn’t answer the question I was putting to you.
June 4th, 2007 at 3:09 pm
Thank you both for the free education. I’m trying to figure out who is winning this argument. Pete’s definition of Transparancy,
“Recall that Transparency, as defined in Ch. 0, is the view that when one has a conscious experience all one is conscious of is what the experience is an experience of.”
And if I understand R. Brown, this claim is too general and transparency really is just experiencing what is being experienced during, specifically, introspection. One question is then, are there any philosophers who claim that there are some conscious states where something other than the direct experience, is being experienced, even if introspection isn’t one of those states? And if there was such a conscious state such that a further “inner episode” helped to construct it, would some consider that introspective? What conscious states, if any, allow for “inner episodes” or “further inner objects” to be present along with the direct object of experience?
June 4th, 2007 at 4:54 pm
Hi A.G.,
I don’t know if I have anything at all helpful to say in response to your questions, since, in all honesty, I must say that I don’t understand what it is that you are asking on any of the three occasions.
But if invited to speak freely on the general topic at this point in the thread, I would say something like the following and hope you’ll find it useful.
If someone is to deny Transitivity, then they are in serious need of an answer to the question, “what are you talking about when you say “conscious states”?”. The best as anyone has been able to tell, including both me and Brown, the answer to that question is what I have recently taken to calling Shmansparency: a conscious state is a state such that you cannot be conscious of properties of the state itself but only conscious of properties that the state is an experience of.
I additionally claim, and Brown denies, that when typcial Transitivity deniers use the word “Transparency”, the view they have in mind is what I call Shmansparency. It is very difficiult at this point to tell who is right in the debate, much less care, since Brown has conceded both that (1) all of the quotes he has appealed to underdetermine the question of which of the two of us has a better interpretation and that (2) those author’s (the Transitivity deniers) agree with Shmansparency anyway. As far as I can tell, the only thing we (Brown and I) could possibly be disagreeing about is what covert implicit mental state certain authors have been in at the exact moment when they have used the word “transparency”.
So, what should you care about? You should care about answering this question: when you say “conscious state” which of the following do you mean?
1) a state of which you are conscious (Transitivity)
2) a state not of which you are conscious, but instead, with which you are conscious (Transparency)
3) a state such that there is something it’s like to be in it (WIL)
or
4) something else we havent’ heard of yet
?
June 4th, 2007 at 9:58 pm
Pete,
I will, as a student exercise, take one question and rewrite/explain it in light of your post, which I assure you I have read at least 3 times. If this doesn’t work, please accept my ignorance as humbly not willful and, on to chapter 3..:)
“are there any philosophers who claim that there are some conscious states where something other than the direct experience, is being experienced, even if introspection isn’t one of those states?”
rewrite:
“Are there any philosophers who deny Transitivity, who argue for transparency, and who claim there might be a conscious state where, to use Tye’s words as quoted by Brown above, one is “aware of those objects [i]and a further inner object”[/i]?
Now, according to 2) in your response to me, my rewrite would be absolutely senseless by the definition of transparency. But is my rewrite senseless according to Browns’s definition where he says,
“when we introspect we ’see’ right through the experience to what the experience is of”
Which isn’t exactly the definition you give in 2). There are times when we introspect, and during those times we see right through the experience to what the experience is of, but there are times when we don’t introspect. And is it possible that during one of those times when we don’t introsepect, that we may in fact have what the experience is of + a further inner object? (according to transparency advocates)
IF shamansparency follows at once from transparency (per Browns def), then it would seem entailed in the general position of transparency and I can’t see how you could be faulted. But if it’s possible that shamansparency doesn’t follow, then maybe you haven’t been careful enough, and so I’d be curious as to which transparency advocates have explicated that.
June 5th, 2007 at 4:05 am
Hi AG, Nice job on the rewording, I think I actually get what you are asking…The answer, I think, is ‘yes’ and the philosopher is Pete Mandik…He denies transitivity and shamsparency and ultimately affirms transparancy (what he says he calls ‘deflationary transparency, but is really just plain old transparency)
Pete, Since I have a psychological disorder which compels me to bash my head against brick walls, I will try one last time to convince you of the error of yor ways ;^)
A. Just for the record and sort of off topic, I think WIL is the best, neutral characterization of conscious mental states and then we can argue over whether transitivity or smansparency are true.
B. I do not really concede that the quotes underdetermine who is right. I know I said that I did, but I was mostly trying to get you to see that they don’t support your reading. I think that anyone who speaks English and knows some philosophy and reads Tye, Dretske, Harman, and etc will see that I am right. These guys ALL say that they are talking about introspection.
C. I do think that they agree with smansparency but that is no reason to think that there is not a difference between transparency and smansparency….which brings us to the last point
D. Why should we care about this? Here is what you say in defense of your reading
what is funny is that smansparency is the thing that cannot play the role in the argument that these guys advocate and so it is you, and your version of transparency, that ends up with these guys being imbeciles. Here’s why.
If you are right then there argument goes like this
1. When I have a conscious mental state I am only conscious of what the experience is of (smansparency)
2. Therefore not transitivity
2a. therefore first-order representationalism
So, you have them as unintelligently begging the question against the HOT-heads, a rather dim-witted move for such a prestigious group!
If I am right then their argument goes like this
1′ when I introspect all I am aware of is what my experiences are of (transparency)
2′ the way the experience seems to me is the way that it is (assumption)
3′ So, when I have a conscious mental state I am only conscious of what the experience is of (follows from 1′, 2′)
4′ Therefore not transitivity (follows from 3′)
4a’ Therefore first-order representationalism
Besides being textually correct, and giving these guys credit for knowing how to make an argument, this way of construing things has the added benefit of making clear how someone could resist the argument from transparency to first-order representationalism/anti-transitivity by denying 1′ (this is the move that you make, I think) or by denying 2′ (this is the move a typical HOT-head ought to make)
By the way, did you know that the identity theory is the claim that the mind supervenes on the body? It’s true! Don’t get “hung up” on words, just because people ‘mention’ the claim tnat the mind and body are identical does not mean that they hold it; anyways, people who hold the identity claim also believe in supervenience, so who cares, right?
Go ahead and reply to this so you can have the last word.
June 5th, 2007 at 4:10 am
AG,
I’m still unsure of whether I understand your question. Maybe the following will help.
Let E be a conscious experience of green grass. All relevant parties agree that E is a mental state. All relevant parties agree that in a relevant sense of “object”, E is an inner object.
Let G be the state of affairs of some grass being green. All relevant parties agree that G is not a mental state and is an outer object.
Let N be a mental state which is an attempt to introspect E. All relevant parties agree that N is a distinct mental state from E, and thus, a distinct inner object from E.
According to Shmansparency, one cannot be conscious of E, one can only be conscious of G. It follows from Shmansparency that, if one attempts to be conscious of E by, for example, having N, one will succeed in having N but fail in being conscious of anything other than G. In other words, E by itself makes you conscious of G, and N + E doesn’t make you consicous of anything else besides G.
According to Brownian Transparency, which is supposed to be directly from the Tye quote, the claim is, as Tye says:
In the symbolism I’ve introduced the claim is something I’ve already said follows from Shmansparency: E by itself makes you conscious of G, and N + E doesn’t make you conscious of anything else besides G.
Now, to address this question:
I interpret the question as asking:
Are there are any philosophers who deny Transitivity, who argue that N doesn’t make you conscious of anything other than G, and who claim that there might be an E, where one is aware of G and also aware of E?
To that question, I’d answer “not any that I’m aware of”. I’d add to that if there were, they would have to posit the existence of a distinct mental state M which is something that makes one conscious of E, but isn’t an introspective state. But I don’t see how one could pull that off. On any definition of introspection that I can think of, if you had a mental state that made you aware of E, it would be an introspective state.
I’m not sure any of this answers what you really wanted to ask, since, for example, you ask
which I interpret as equivalent to asking:
“Is it possible that when we have E without N we still have G and E?”
To which the answer is clearly “yes” but I’m kinda not sure why anyone would see the need to ask that.
Please let me know if any of this is at all helpful.
June 5th, 2007 at 4:55 am
Richard,
I don’t think we need to disagree on how the argument for FOR goes. I can grant that the longer one better captures the argument that the FOR-heads have in mind. We just disagree on what to label the various premises.
I think it’s clear that when FOR-heads start tossing the word “transparency” around, it isn’t terribly clear whether they intend it to refer only to 1 or to 3 or to 1 & 3. My bet is that they don’t much care, since they endorse both 1 and 3, and 3 is supposed to follow from 1 in one way or another.
June 5th, 2007 at 10:08 am
Yes! exactly! that’s what I meant, hurray!
And to only compound my joy, you write,
Which incidently, directly and precisely answered my third question,
“And if there was such a conscious state such that a further “inner episode†helped to construct it, would some consider that introspective?”
I see now how badly I wrote that. But your answer is “yes” by any definition you can think of.
The reason I thought it was important to ask those again, was because if by mere definition introspection is N+E, then my thinking was transparency per Brown’s definition IS in fact shamansparency and therefore no need for you to make a distinction. In other words, I thought Brown might be saying (or needed to be saying to make his objection valid) some philosophers who argue for transparency don’t force First Order Representation to necessarily (though it likely would) follow from introspection since there might be another mental state where something in addition to G (like E) is conscious of. In other words, transparancy + something else = no transitivity = FOR. Now from Brown’s last post, I see his position is more subtle. In any case, for some reason I’ve found yours and his discussion here over this hair-splitting matter helpful.
June 5th, 2007 at 12:18 pm
Excellent. Thanks for being patient with me on this.
One thing I said that I’d like to correct is the following. Instead of saying “On any definition of introspection that I can think of, if you had a mental state that made you aware of E, it would be an introspective state” I should have said “On any definition of introspection embraced by deniers of Transitivity that I can think of, if you had a mental state that made you aware of E, it would be an introspective state. ”
The point of the italicized addition is to acknowledge that there are, as a matter of fact, theorists that think that there can be a state M that would count as a state of being conscious of E without M being an introspective state. Uber-HOT-head David Rosenthal, for instance, thinks that introspection requires a third-order representation that makes conscious a second-order representation of E. the second order representation all by itself , according to Rosenthal, wouldn’t count as a state of introspection. Rosenthal is famous, among other things, for his enthusiasm for Transitivity. I’m aware of no Transitivity deniers that would allow for the non-introspective awareness of one’s own mental states.
June 6th, 2007 at 7:24 am
**Brown wonders why everyone is calling him ‘Brown’**
June 7th, 2007 at 10:02 am
A.G. started it. You can get back at him by just calling him “G” for now on.
July 11th, 2007 at 3:55 am
Hi Pete,
I’ve been reading a few chapters of your book and I have a few questions about neuro-introspection. I have to say it’s a pretty exciting thesis! And I’m sympathetic with reductionism. But I’ve a few worries.
I take it the claim is meant to be that someone with sufficient neuroscientific knowledge could *directly* introspect their brain states as such (if the title of Churchland’s 1985 paper is anything to go by). If that’s right, then the coffee example strikes me as poor analogy. Firstly, perceiving the heat of the coffee by perceiving its steam looks like a case of *indirect* perception (i.e. the claim seems to be I perceive x by perceiving y). You seem to think it’s a case of direct perception, however. You say:
“If I learn, then, to apply the concept of heat automatically … to coffee
on the sight of steam rising through it, then what I’ve learned to do is see the heat of the coffee.”
Secondly, do we *see* heat? We can *see that* something is hot (again by seeing some feature of it). Do you think seeing heat and seeing that something is hot are the same? The first sounds direct, the second–indirect. But I would have thought that if heat perception is to be direct, then the sense modality through such an experience is afforded is going to have to be tactile, rather than visual (otherwise it just sounds a bit like a category error). It sounds like something that is standardly attributed to one modality is being attributed to another if you think we directly perceive heat by seeing steam.
Relatedly, in what sense can the introspection of one’s brain states be direct if it is mediated by mental states? I take it the neuro-introspectionist doesn’t claim that one could introspect their brain states without introspecting mental states. Rather, they claim we introspect brain states as such by first introspecting mental states (again, this sounds like such introspection of brain states is thereby indirect). Or am I wrong? Actually this has me thinking that maybe I’m not clear about the sense of direct at issue here.
Thirdly (thanks for sticking with me if you’ve gotten this far!), how do you see multiple realizability squaring with neuro-introspection? I think that worries about the compatability of reductivism and MR are overblown and there’s some plausible responses in the literature. But squaring neuro-introspection with MR looks somewhat difficult. Suppose mental states are multiply realizable. They don’t have to be radically or wildly multiply realizable for my worry to get going. Just suppose that, for any given mental state type, that type could potentially be realised by two distinct brain state types. (That’s not much multiple realizability at all!) My worry is this: although someone could possess idealised neuroscientific knowledge of which brain states realise which mental states, upon experiencing some mental state they will not be in a position to know which of two brain state they are in. So neuro-introspection seems to fail if mental states are multiply realizable even to only the smallest degree.
July 11th, 2007 at 5:06 am
Hi Dan,
Thanks for your thoughtful remarks. Regarding the issues concerning directness, I hope to have adequate responses within the next 24hrs, but I’m in a hurry to get out the door right now.
Regarding MR, due to arguments set forth in ch. 1, I don’t take it particularly seriously. But considering my introspection thesis in isolation from ch. 1, I can grant, for the sake of discussion, relatively strong versions of MR. Since I think perception and introspection are analogous in many significant ways, it is useful to consider the MR issue by constructing an analogy to perception. Suppose there is some object type that is not only multiply realizable but multiply realized. Suppose further that the object type bottle is one such example. So there are lots of distinct physical realizers of bottles, e.g. glass ones and aluminum ones. But this supposed fact (the multiple realizability of bottles) is not all by itself a problem for standard accounts of object perception. There’s not an obvious problem of how one can perceive not only that a bottle is present but that a glass bottle is present, is there?
Perhaps you think my example concerning glass vs. aluminum is a poor one since glass and aluminum are readily perceptually distinguishable. Suppose then that we switch examples to perceptually undetectable realization differences, e.g. two kinds of glass that can only be distinguished with special instruments. Now we have an example in which some properties of bottles are imperceptible. But this doesn’t raise any special problems for a theory that claims that bottles are perceptible. It’s pretty obvious that even though perceptible objects must have perceptible properties, they may nonetheless have imperceptible properties as well. I offer, then, that an analogous thing is true of introspection: neural states have neural properties that are intropsectible, but perhaps they also have some neural properties that are introspectively undetectable. How does that show the failure of neuro-introspection?
July 11th, 2007 at 10:27 am
Hi Dan,
I think most of what I have to say about your directness questions probably involves a bunch of boring terminological stipulations instead of anything particularly exciting or substantive.
I think most if not all that needs to be said about the relevant issues concerning perception can be done in terms of a three-way distinction (a tristinction!) between sensation, perception, and inferences based on what’s perceived. A similar tristinction may be drawn between sensation, introspection, and inferences based on what’s introspected. Sensations are non-conceptual and carry information about themselves and their causes. Perceptions are conceptual and involve the automatic conceptual exploitation of information that sensations carry about their causes. Introspections are conceptual and involve the conceptual exploitation of information that sensations carry about themselves. Inferences involve the non-automatic application of concepts.
I try to illustrate all of this stuff in terms of the story of George, John, and the man in the gorilla suit in section 3 of chapter 2. George, the special effects expert, and John, the novice, both have the same sensations, I suppose. George is able to see the person as a man in a gorilla suit. I might just as well say that George is able to see that this is a man in a gorilla suit. John is able only to infer, based on what he perceives (plus what George tells him), that this is a man in a gorilla suit. This is not to deny, however, that John is incapable of seeing this as something or seeing that something is the case. John may being seeing this as a living organism.
I’m not particularly thrilled about the vocabulary of “direct†and “indirectâ€. A lot of what some people want to call direct perception I would call “sensation†and a lot of what some people want to call indirect perception I wouldn’t call perception at all, but conclusions of inferences. I worry about certain baggage associated with “directâ€, in particular, the view that there can be unmediated epistemic access to anything. That strikes me as a nutty view and I don’t want to be read as assuming its truth.
Ok, now to explicitly address your points and questions:
You ask: “[D]o we *see* heat? We can *see that* something is hot (again by seeing some feature of it). Do you think seeing heat and seeing that something is hot are the same? The first sounds direct, the second–indirect.â€
Let me start by saying that I assume seeing to be a kind of perceiving. So, visual sensation alone would not count as seeing. Further, I acknowledge a distinction between seeing heat and seeing that something is hot. I also take this to be the same distinction as that between seeing heat and seeing heat as heat. I don’t think, however, that there’s such a thing as seeing heat without seeing it as something or without seeing that something is the case. A visual sensory response to heat without concept application would be sensation, not seeing. I really don’t know how best to apply the “direct†and “indirect†vocabulary to these kinds of cases. Is the direct thing the sensation? Or is it the seeing of the heat as something but not seeing it as heat? I propose to just do without that vocabulary.
You propose:
“[P]erceiving the heat of the coffee by perceiving its steam looks like a case of *indirect* perception (i.e. the claim seems to be I perceive x by perceiving y)â€
Another way of describing what’s going on in the coffee case is that I have a visual sensation which is caused by hot steam and thus carries information both about the presence of heat and of steam and I perceive (visually!) both heat and steam though none either more or less directly than the other. (I think I need to be much clearer about this in a revised version of the chapter.)
Regarding introspection, you ask:
“[I]n what sense can the introspection of one’s brain states be direct if it is mediated by mental states? I take it the neuro-introspectionist doesn’t claim that one could introspect their brain states without introspecting mental states. Rather, they claim we introspect brain states as such by first introspecting mental states (again, this sounds like such introspection of brain states is thereby indirect). Or am I wrong??â€
Here’s how I’d describe what’s going on. Sensation is one mental state. When I introspect the sensation, that involves a second mental state, which itself is a conceptual representation of the first state. Also, the occurrence of the second state must be an automatic response to the first state. Now, some people who don’t hate the word “direct†would say that the introspection is direct insofar as it is automatic. Others would say it is not direct because it involves a representation. I prefer to say what’s going on without using the word “directâ€.
Raising some interesting concerns about modality individuation, you write:
“I would have thought that if heat perception is to be direct, then the sense modality through such an experience is afforded is going to have to be tactile, rather than visual (otherwise it just sounds a bit like a category error).â€
I think the distinction between dermal thermoreceptors and retinal photoreceptors will be important for distinguishing between seeing heat and feeling it. But I don’t see that much work can be done about directness in terms of receptors. Patterns of activity in the retina carry information about all sorts of stuff, like what color it is, how hot it is, whether it was manufactured in China, etc. Anything I can figure out by looking at something must involve information that passes through my retina, so I’m not optimistic that one can settle questions concerning directness in terms of what can and cannot be transduced at the site of reception. But then again, I don’t feel particularly motivated to settle questions concerning directness, at least, not in the vocabulary of “directnessâ€.
Thanks for your questions. I’ve enjoyed the opportunity to work more carefully through the relation of neuro-introspection to various claims about directness. I hope I’ve made sense!
July 18th, 2007 at 2:16 pm
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September 14th, 2007 at 5:48 am
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