Comments on: Subjectivity and Meta-meta-blogging http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2007/04/20/subjectivity-and-meta-meta-blogging/ Pete Mandik's Intermittently Neurophilosophical Weblog Sun, 14 Mar 2010 15:39:15 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.7.1 hourly 1 By: Pete Mandik http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2007/04/20/subjectivity-and-meta-meta-blogging/comment-page-1/#comment-17792 Pete Mandik Mon, 23 Apr 2007 14:23:38 +0000 http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2007/04/20/subjectivity-and-meta-meta-blogging/#comment-17792 Hi A.G., Your comment here makes me think that you would be much more interested in a different paper of mine: "An Epistemological Theory of Consciousness?". See, especially, sections 3 and 6. Link: <a href="http://www.petemandik.com/philosophy/papers/epistemconsc.pdf" rel="nofollow">http://www.petemandik.com/philosophy/papers/epistemconsc.pdf</a> Hi A.G.,

Your comment here makes me think that you would be much more interested in a different paper of mine: “An Epistemological Theory of Consciousness?”. See, especially, sections 3 and 6.

Link:

http://www.petemandik.com/philosophy/papers/epistemconsc.pdf

]]> By: AG http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2007/04/20/subjectivity-and-meta-meta-blogging/comment-page-1/#comment-17747 AG Mon, 23 Apr 2007 06:03:55 +0000 http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2007/04/20/subjectivity-and-meta-meta-blogging/#comment-17747 Hey man, I did say it was an unjust summary. I'm at a different computer right now and it appears I can't copy and paste from my own blog. Yeah, I agree the distinction you make is an important one. If you follow down about half way where I start out, "raising the bar..." it's more clear that I'm trying to take your thesis on "knowledge" and see if some of the same concepts can be extended (along with sources from your paper and a couple of Dennett's observation) to cover qualia. Going back and reading what I wrote I admit other than in that one paragraph I'm pretty unclear on this point. If you're right about knowledge, I have a hard time believing that qualia can still stand and ultimately it seems to me that what is considered qualia has to be something of the same mundane stuff on that spectrum. I have a really hard time understanding how in a mass of wet neurons, there is this clear categorical distinction between knowledge of propositions and things like sense and feeling. Anyway, I sorta in my mind, always want to jump right to qualia because the gap seems to have strengthened it's thesis from knowledge (in Nagel) to more recent dualist arguments. Right around the corner, after securing knowledge in a convincing way will be someone from the gap side of things inquiring about how certain 'abilities' can be explained physically. Hey man, I did say it was an unjust summary. I’m at a different computer right now and it appears I can’t copy and paste from my own blog. Yeah, I agree the distinction you make is an important one. If you follow down about half way where I start out, “raising the bar…” it’s more clear that I’m trying to take your thesis on “knowledge” and see if some of the same concepts can be extended (along with sources from your paper and a couple of Dennett’s observation) to cover qualia. Going back and reading what I wrote I admit other than in that one paragraph I’m pretty unclear on this point.

If you’re right about knowledge, I have a hard time believing that qualia can still stand and ultimately it seems to me that what is considered qualia has to be something of the same mundane stuff on that spectrum. I have a really hard time understanding how in a mass of wet neurons, there is this clear categorical distinction between knowledge of propositions and things like sense and feeling.

Anyway, I sorta in my mind, always want to jump right to qualia because the gap seems to have strengthened it’s thesis from knowledge (in Nagel) to more recent dualist arguments. Right around the corner, after securing knowledge in a convincing way will be someone from the gap side of things inquiring about how certain ‘abilities’ can be explained physically.

]]>