“The Genuine Problem of Consciousness” by Anthony Jack (Washington University),Â Philip Robbins (Wahsington University), and Andreas Roepstorff (Aarhus University)
Those who are optimistic about the prospects of a science of consciousness, and those who believe that it lies beyond the reach of standard scientific methods, have something in common: both groups view consciousness as posing a special challenge for science. In this paper, we take a close look at the nature of this challenge. We show that popular conceptions of the problem of consciousness, epitomized by David Chalmersâ€™ formulation of the â€˜hard problemâ€™, can be best explained as a cognitive illusion, which arises as a by-product of our cognitive architecture. We present evidence from numerous sources to support our claim that we have a specialized system for thinking about phenomenal states, and that an inhibitory relationship exists between this system and the system we use to think about physical mechanisms. Even though the â€˜hard problemâ€™ is an illusion, unfortunately it appears that our cognitive architecture forces a closely related problem upon us. The â€˜genuine problemâ€™ of consciousness shares many features with the hard problem, and it also represents a special challenge for psychology. Nonetheless, researchers should be careful not to mistake the hard problem for the genuine problem, since the strategies appropriate for dealing with these problems differ in important respects.