Consider the following figure from Cavanagh et al. (1998):
[O]ne is phenomenally conscious of them. And one can say roughly how many there are. But, to the extent that one cannot attend to them, one cannot apply concepts to them, e.g. shape concepts.
Block’s idea here is that the attentional resolution effect helps support a distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness. The extent to which concepts cannot be empolyed to the lines on the left is the extent to which they cannot be individually attended. But note that there remain lots of ways in which concepts may nonetheless be applied to the lines on the left. To mention just one, consider conceiving of them as “the lines on the left.”
Block, N. (2001). Paradox and Cross Purposes in Recent Work on Consciousness in Stan Dehaene, ed., The Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness, M.I.T. Press
Cavanagh, P., He, S., & Intriligator, J. (1998). Attentional resolution: The grain and locus of visual awareness. In C. Taddei-Ferretti (Ed.), Neuronal basis and psychological aspects of consciousness. Singapore: World Scientific