I’m happy at this point to view our disagreement as verbal. There’s something that bothers me about this “purport to refer” stuff that I cannot articulate to my satisfaction. Here’s an unsatisfactory attempt:

There are two different kinds of things that fail to refer: those that purport but fail, and those that don’t even purport. What account can be given of what this difference consists in that doesn’t just sneak through the back door the relationality of purporting? I can’t think of one, so there is none.

As I said, that’s unsatisfactory, so I’m happy to drop it for now.

P.S. So, what are the origins of “Cambridge properties” and “Cambridge changes”? I have a dim recollection that these were born of disparaging remarks made by someone not at Cambridge.

So, in answer to your question, I think I’d say this. r bears R to u but not a, b, c, etc. simply in virtue of the fact that u is not identical with a, b, c, etc.

Now, you don’t like saying ‘unicorn representations don’t represent unicorns’. I think I do like saying it, but I think our disagreement is verbal. I read it as saying that unicorn representations don’t refer to unicorns, and you (I’ll bet) read it as saying that unicorn representations dont’ *purport* to refer to unicorns.

I’ll be glad to adopt your lingo. To represent unicorns is to purport to refer to unicorns. The important point is that purporting to refer to unicorns is an intrinsic feature of a unicorn representation. So, if there were any unicorns, they would be referred to by unicorn-representations simply in virtue of the fact that (a) the unicorns exist while (b) there are representations with a certain intrinsic feature. That makes being referred to by a unicorn representation a Cambridge property.

And so we have the Moorean Mermaid:

1. Phenomenality is a genuine property, not a Cambridge property.
2. “Being represented” is a Cambridge property.
3. Therefore, phenomenality is not the same as being represented.

[I have no idea why I want associate Moore with the disparaging of Cambridge properties, but I was really aiming for fantastical alliteration more than anything else.]

Thanks for the reference. Thanks too for exploring this line.

I really have no problem with R beyond calling it ‘representation’ and related problems.

I don’t mind saying that there are relations between x and y that obtain between them solely in virtue of their existing, for example, “_is a proper part of the same mereological fusion as _ is” or “_is a member of the same set as _is”.

I do mind saying things like “unicorn representations don’t represent unicorns”

Suppose there exists both a unicorn, u, and a unicorn-rerpesentation, r.

I bet there are lots of relations that r bears to u in virtue of them both existing. Which one is the R relation?

I bet there are lots of relations r bears to things a, b, c, etc. other than u in virtue of merely existing. In virtue of what does r bear R to u but not a, b, c, etc?

So, I think you can accept premise 1 without supposing that the existence of unicorn-representations implies the existence of unicorns. Unicorn-representations don’t represent unicorns (there being no unicorns for them to represent), but they would if only there were some unicorns for them to represent.

Another way of putting the point of the previous paragraph: Being a unicorn representation is not a relation to unicorns, and it is not the same as representing unicorns. Unicorn representations and unicorns are independent existences, and for a unicorn representation to represent a unicorn is nothing more than for both of them to exist.

As for a concise statement of Heil’s thoughts on representation, I think I’d direct you to Chapter 18, “Intentionality,” in *From and Ontological Point of View*. But beware, I think he’s more interested in defending internalism there than anything else, and he doesn’t say explicitly that representation is an internal relation. My attribution is based on having heard him say that truth-making is an internal relation about seventy or eighty times this summer.

You might find that the nascent internalism of the view that representation is an internal relation is not to your liking. I wouldn’t blame you fo that at all.

The allegedly Heil-ish Hippogriff somewhat appealing, though I personally am not real happy with the first premise (on account of not being real happy saying that representation is any kind of relation, internal or otherwise, between a representer and a represented).

I confess to having read very little Heil. Where might I look for a concise statement of his thoughts on representation?