Comments on: Phenomenal realism and empirical depth http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2006/08/17/phenomenal-realism-and-empirical-depth/ Pete Mandik's Intermittently Neurophilosophical Weblog Fri, 12 Mar 2010 21:17:22 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.7.1 hourly 1 By: Philosophers’ Carnival :: Philosophers’ Carnival XXXV :: September :: 2006 http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2006/08/17/phenomenal-realism-and-empirical-depth/comment-page-1/#comment-17818 Philosophers’ Carnival :: Philosophers’ Carnival XXXV :: September :: 2006 Mon, 23 Apr 2007 17:34:46 +0000 http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2006/08/17/phenomenal-realism-and-empirical-depth/#comment-17818 [...] Brain Hammer: http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2006/08/17/phenomenal-realism-and-empirical-depth/ [...] [...] Brain Hammer: http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2006/08/17/phenomenal-realism-and-empirical-depth/ [...]

]]> By: Pete Mandik http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2006/08/17/phenomenal-realism-and-empirical-depth/comment-page-1/#comment-1541 Pete Mandik Mon, 21 Aug 2006 12:46:27 +0000 http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2006/08/17/phenomenal-realism-and-empirical-depth/#comment-1541 Peter, I think you raise some pretty interesting points. Thanks for the comment. I stand by my point, though. Perhaps it can be made more convincing if I am more explicit about distinguishing belief in the existence of something from belief in realism about something. I think your analogy between life and qualia is pretty interesting. I suppose that there is something basic about our belief in living things. For example, we have believed that things are alive way before we've done any scientific theorizing. Further, there is probably a good case to be made that our cognitive grasp of life is rooted in a lot of innate stuff. For example, maybe newborns are capable of distinguishing biological from non-biological motion. However, here's the key point: all of this stuff is consistent with people believing in the existence of living things while simultaneously being <I>neutral</I> on the question of realism about living things, that is, neutral on the question of whether facts about living things outstrip our beliefs about living things. <I>That</I> question, I suppose, isn't basic or contemplated until we've done quite a bit of theorizing. Further, I think the best case to be made about biological realism involves the empirical depth of life and related concepts. Regarding the empirical depth of such concepts, consider the explanatory and predictive force of attributing life to something. Suppose there were a strange object that was found in someone's back yard that at first glance looked like a rock but upon further examination was covered in a thin coat of slime once a day around noon and turned green around dusk. A pretty good explanation and guide to further predictions would involve attributing life to that object. And again, all this stuff about empirical depth and realism is fully consistent with saying that life is some obvious thing that calls out for an explanation. Regarding qualia, I think that there are qualia. I haven't fully made up my mind about realism v. idealism about qualia (though I lean toward realism). I doubt, though, that our notion of qualia is anywhere near as basic or pre-theoretical as our notion of life. But even if it were, that wouldn't contradict the claim that the best reasons for being a realist hinge on empirical depth. Peter, I think you raise some pretty interesting points. Thanks for the comment. I stand by my point, though. Perhaps it can be made more convincing if I am more explicit about distinguishing belief in the existence of something from belief in realism about something. I think your analogy between life and qualia is pretty interesting. I suppose that there is something basic about our belief in living things. For example, we have believed that things are alive way before we’ve done any scientific theorizing. Further, there is probably a good case to be made that our cognitive grasp of life is rooted in a lot of innate stuff. For example, maybe newborns are capable of distinguishing biological from non-biological motion. However, here’s the key point: all of this stuff is consistent with people believing in the existence of living things while simultaneously being neutral on the question of realism about living things, that is, neutral on the question of whether facts about living things outstrip our beliefs about living things. That question, I suppose, isn’t basic or contemplated until we’ve done quite a bit of theorizing. Further, I think the best case to be made about biological realism involves the empirical depth of life and related concepts.

Regarding the empirical depth of such concepts, consider the explanatory and predictive force of attributing life to something. Suppose there were a strange object that was found in someone’s back yard that at first glance looked like a rock but upon further examination was covered in a thin coat of slime once a day around noon and turned green around dusk. A pretty good explanation and guide to further predictions would involve attributing life to that object. And again, all this stuff about empirical depth and realism is fully consistent with saying that life is some obvious thing that calls out for an explanation.

Regarding qualia, I think that there are qualia. I haven’t fully made up my mind about realism v. idealism about qualia (though I lean toward realism). I doubt, though, that our notion of qualia is anywhere near as basic or pre-theoretical as our notion of life. But even if it were, that wouldn’t contradict the claim that the best reasons for being a realist hinge on empirical depth.

]]> By: Anibal http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2006/08/17/phenomenal-realism-and-empirical-depth/comment-page-1/#comment-1466 Anibal Fri, 18 Aug 2006 23:34:35 +0000 http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2006/08/17/phenomenal-realism-and-empirical-depth/#comment-1466 Near death experiences (NDE) we can consider them as generally produce by decreased oxygenation or reduce blood flow in the brain produce by cardiogenic shocks, cardiac arrests or effects of anaesthesia. So are linked to physical processes that allow us to exclude substance dualism. Although Eric is right in emphysizing their phenomenal reality from the perspective of the subjetc. I align myself with Mandik, Dennett or the Churchlands. And why to admitt qualia as explananda rather than explanans, is becuase maybe if we sustain a compatibilist vision around the subpersonal and the personal level assuming no priority among them, but neverthless, favouring the subpersonal level; we can describe the functional properties of enabling mechanisms acurrately and hence provide an explanation of some high order phenomena, such as qualia, depichering them in abstract terms, idealistic terms, revisionary terms or even eliminativistc terms. Near death experiences (NDE) we can consider them as generally produce by decreased oxygenation or reduce blood flow in the brain produce by cardiogenic shocks, cardiac arrests or effects of anaesthesia. So are linked to physical processes that allow us to exclude substance dualism.

Although Eric is right in emphysizing their phenomenal reality from the perspective of the subjetc.

I align myself with Mandik, Dennett or the Churchlands. And why to admitt qualia as explananda rather than explanans, is becuase maybe if we sustain a compatibilist vision around the subpersonal and the personal level assuming no priority among them, but neverthless, favouring the subpersonal level; we can describe the functional properties of enabling mechanisms acurrately and hence provide an explanation of some high order phenomena, such as qualia, depichering them in abstract terms, idealistic terms, revisionary terms or even eliminativistc terms.

]]> By: Peter Langland-Hassan http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2006/08/17/phenomenal-realism-and-empirical-depth/comment-page-1/#comment-1457 Peter Langland-Hassan Fri, 18 Aug 2006 14:21:15 +0000 http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2006/08/17/phenomenal-realism-and-empirical-depth/#comment-1457 If I may briefly vent the qualophilic perspective: qualia are not "posits" that gain acceptance into one's ontology through their ability to explain otherwise mysterious phenomena. Rather, they are occurrent features of everyday experience that themselves stand in need of explanation. Pete's claim that "the best reasons for being a realist about anything have to do with the gains in empirical depth thereby achieved," is simply false. People are realists about life not because the concept of life allows one to plumb new explanatory depths, but because it is an obvious phenomenon that calls out for explanation. What justifies admitting qualia as explananda and not explanans? The way Pete would have it, the claims of qualophiles are no more legitimate than those of someone who posits hitherto undiscovered particles that are somehow unobservably embedded within molecules, doing no causal work. But this cannot be the nature of the qualophile's claim, since, if it were, his claim would never have garnered years of philosophical and scientific scrutiny. Qualia must either be given an explanation, or it must be explained why one's request for a (non-idealist) explanation of qualia is illegitimate. A mere appeal to the success of other "functionalist" theories doesn't take us far--we should not conclude from our inability to understand something that we do understand it after all. Not that I'm a crazy dualist, of course. If I may briefly vent the qualophilic perspective: qualia are not “posits” that gain acceptance into one’s ontology through their ability to explain otherwise mysterious phenomena. Rather, they are occurrent features of everyday experience that themselves stand in need of explanation. Pete’s claim that “the best reasons for being a realist about anything have to do with the gains in empirical depth thereby achieved,” is simply false. People are realists about life not because the concept of life allows one to plumb new explanatory depths, but because it is an obvious phenomenon that calls out for explanation.

What justifies admitting qualia as explananda and not explanans? The way Pete would have it, the claims of qualophiles are no more legitimate than those of someone who posits hitherto undiscovered particles that are somehow unobservably embedded within molecules, doing no causal work.
But this cannot be the nature of the qualophile’s claim, since, if it were, his claim would never have garnered years of philosophical and scientific scrutiny.

Qualia must either be given an explanation, or it must be explained why one’s request for a (non-idealist) explanation of qualia is illegitimate. A mere appeal to the success of other “functionalist” theories doesn’t take us far–we should not conclude from our inability to understand something that we do understand it after all.

Not that I’m a crazy dualist, of course.

]]> By: Pete Mandik http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2006/08/17/phenomenal-realism-and-empirical-depth/comment-page-1/#comment-1455 Pete Mandik Fri, 18 Aug 2006 13:56:32 +0000 http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2006/08/17/phenomenal-realism-and-empirical-depth/#comment-1455 Good point, Eric. Dualisms are not essentially empirically shallow. The philosophical arguments for dualism that I'm aware of, however, typically insulate the position from empirical testing. Good point, Eric. Dualisms are not essentially empirically shallow. The philosophical arguments for dualism that I’m aware of, however, typically insulate the position from empirical testing.

]]> By: Eric Schwitzgebel http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2006/08/17/phenomenal-realism-and-empirical-depth/comment-page-1/#comment-1443 Eric Schwitzgebel Fri, 18 Aug 2006 04:55:49 +0000 http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2006/08/17/phenomenal-realism-and-empirical-depth/#comment-1443 How about substance dualism as a position? It could predict and explain "paranormal" experiences like out-of-body and near-death experiences, psi phenomena, etc. I'm not quite a believer in such things, but there is some interesting empirical evidence it's hard entirely to dismiss. Now we've got a real, empirical question on our hands! How about substance dualism as a position? It could predict and explain “paranormal” experiences like out-of-body and near-death experiences, psi phenomena, etc. I’m not quite a believer in such things, but there is some interesting empirical evidence it’s hard entirely to dismiss. Now we’ve got a real, empirical question on our hands!

]]>