I’m kicking around the idea of a transcendental argument for a reductive theory of consciousness. The basic form of the argument I have in mind would go something like this:
1. I know that I am not a zombie
2. My knowing that I am not a zombie entails the satisfaction of condition K
3. My physical doppelganger satisfies condition K
.: My physical doppelganger is not a zombie
Most of the heavy lifting will involve spelling out condition K such that 2 and 3 turn out true.
Some further thoughts on condition K: My conscious states are necessarily knowable by me as such: knowable by me as my conscious states. In order for this to be true, conscious states must be conceptualized and egocentric. Knowablity entails conceptualization (as I’ve argued here). And â€œas my own”-ness entails egocentricity (I’ll flesh this out further in a future post).
The first-person point of view delivers the conceptuality and egocentricity of our conscious states. That such conditions can be satisfied by third-person-accessible physical facts is the major thrust of my Allocentric-Egocentric Interface theory of consciousness (available here). I’m working up this stuff about the transcendental argument for a revised version of my paper “An Epistemic Theory of Consciousness?” (early draft available here).
More to follow in future posts.
Fig. 1: SwampMan, Twin SwampMan, and a Pair of Phenomenal Zebras