Archive for May, 2006

Warren Ellis’ DIY Mind Gangsterism

Sunday, May 28th, 2006

Ellis’ notes on “DIY Mind Gangsterism”

Part One

Part Two

Part Three

Part Four

Squash Box

Tuesday, May 23rd, 2006

Squash Box
Originally uploaded by Pete Mandik.

Four Neurofictions

Wednesday, May 17th, 2006

Neurologist Todd E. Feinberg reviews some neuroficiton in Four Fictional Odysseys Through Life With a Disordered Brain

Beware: Robo-Vanity

Tuesday, May 16th, 2006

And I thought the best way to make a self-conscious robot was to tell it that its fly was open.


Adventures in Neurobotics

Monday, May 15th, 2006

To Whom it May Concern–

The Summer 2006 reading list in Neurobotics for the The Philosophical Animat Research Group:

Wheeler, M. (2005). Friends Reunited? Evolutionary Robotics and Representational Explanation. Artificial Life. 11 (1-2): 215-232

Ruppin, Eytan. (2002). Evolutionary Autonomous Agents: A Neuroscience Perspective. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 3(2), February issue, p. 132 - 142.

Yaeger, L., and Sporns, O. (2006) Evolution of neural structure and complexity in a computational ecology. In Rocha, L. et al. eds. Artificial Life X. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Sporns, O., and Alexander, W.H. (2002) Neuromodulation and plasticity in an autonomous robot. Neural Networks 15, 761-774.



Bucket of Fur

Thursday, May 11th, 2006

Bucket of Fur
Originally uploaded by Pete Mandik.

BRAIN HAMMER!!!

Tuesday, May 9th, 2006

BRAIN HAMMER!!!

Phenomenal consciousness of inexistent colors

Friday, May 5th, 2006

Colors Paul Churchland calls “chimerical“, like what Mark Johnston calls “supersaturated red“, pose an interesting problem for qualia representationalism (QR). If we interpret QR as holding that a property is phenomenal when it is represented in a certain way, then phenomenality is relational. However, relations are instantiated only when their relata exist. And in chimerical color experiences, not only do the colors experienced not exist, they cannot exist. So the phenomenality of chimerical color experiences cannot consist in any relations to chimerically colored objects in the actual world or any non-acutal possible world since there are none.

One response to this problem would be to dump the representationalism. Another is to hold onto the representationalism and also a theory of content that is very narrow. I’m inclined toward the latter option.

Online Philosophy Conference

Tuesday, May 2nd, 2006

This should be pretty cool: Online Philosophy Conference.