Ellis’ notes on “DIY Mind Gangsterism”
Archive for May, 2006
Warren Ellis’ DIY Mind Gangsterism
Sunday, May 28th, 2006Squash Box
Tuesday, May 23rd, 2006
Four Neurofictions
Wednesday, May 17th, 2006Neurologist Todd E. Feinberg reviews some neuroficiton in Four Fictional Odysseys Through Life With a Disordered Brain
Beware: Robo-Vanity
Tuesday, May 16th, 2006And I thought the best way to make a self-conscious robot was to tell it that its fly was open.
Adventures in Neurobotics
Monday, May 15th, 2006To Whom it May Concern–
The Summer 2006 reading list in Neurobotics for the The Philosophical Animat Research Group:
Wheeler, M. (2005). Friends Reunited? Evolutionary Robotics and Representational Explanation. Artificial Life. 11 (1-2): 215-232
Ruppin, Eytan. (2002). Evolutionary Autonomous Agents: A Neuroscience Perspective. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 3(2), February issue, p. 132 - 142.
Yaeger, L., and Sporns, O. (2006) Evolution of neural structure and complexity in a computational ecology. In Rocha, L. et al. eds. Artificial Life X. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Sporns, O., and Alexander, W.H. (2002) Neuromodulation and plasticity in an autonomous robot. Neural Networks 15, 761-774.
Bucket of Fur
Thursday, May 11th, 2006
BRAIN HAMMER!!!
Tuesday, May 9th, 2006Phenomenal consciousness of inexistent colors
Friday, May 5th, 2006Colors Paul Churchland calls “chimerical“, like what Mark Johnston calls “supersaturated red“, pose an interesting problem for qualia representationalism (QR). If we interpret QR as holding that a property is phenomenal when it is represented in a certain way, then phenomenality is relational. However, relations are instantiated only when their relata exist. And in chimerical color experiences, not only do the colors experienced not exist, they cannot exist. So the phenomenality of chimerical color experiences cannot consist in any relations to chimerically colored objects in the actual world or any non-acutal possible world since there are none.
One response to this problem would be to dump the representationalism. Another is to hold onto the representationalism and also a theory of content that is very narrow. I’m inclined toward the latter option.
Online Philosophy Conference
Tuesday, May 2nd, 2006This should be pretty cool: Online Philosophy Conference.
I am Associate Professor and Chair of Philosophy and Coordinator of the Cognitive Science Laboratory at William Paterson University in New Jersey. This blog largely concerns my interests in the Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Neuroscience, but also contains evidence of my messing around with art, photography, fiction, and robotics. Find out way more about me and my work